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Abstract	In	2010	the	Marine	Corps	started	a	small,	experimental	capability,	the	Translational	Research	Group	(TRG),	to	help	the	organization	more	effectively	integrate	social	science	and	scientists	into	decision-making.	In	contrast	to	other	recent	military	social	science	programs,	TRG	focuses	inward,	on	Marines	and	Marine	Corps	organizations.	The	group	houses	fieldwork-focused	social	scientists	within	a	military	organization	so	they	can	understand	the	problem-framing	context	and	implementation	processes,	but	provides	significantly	greater	academic	freedom	and	protection	from	over-tasking	than	is	the	norm	in	military	research	settings.	Researchers	conduct	independently	designed	projects,	support	curriculum	development,	and	provide	social	science	advice	to	a	broad	scope	of	military	organizations.	Although	leadership	support	for	the	group	has	been	strong,	there	have	been	significant	impediments	to	fully	institutionalizing	the	capability.	This	field	report	provides	an	outline	of	the	background	and	design	of	the	group	and	examines	some	of	the	key	challenges	encountered	during	implementation.		
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Overview	This	field	report	describes	the	ongoing	process	of	trying	to	implement	a	research	and	scientific	advisory	capability	within	a	large	organization.	In	2010	the	Marine	Corps	launched	a	small	experiment	in	integrating	social	science	and	social	scientists	into	organizational	decision-making.1	The	experiment	was	a	response	to	concerns	raised	by	senior	leaders	and	researchers	about	existing	patterns	of	how	research	was	conducted	and	how	results	and	expertise	were	leveraged	(see	Fosher	2015	for	a	more	complete	overview	of	these	issues).		Our	first	set	of	concerns,	those	about	the	conduct	of	research,	centered	on	the	ability	of	researchers	to	balance	practical	understanding	of	military	organizations	with	scientific	rigor	and	autonomy.	Developing	an	understanding	of	any	one	military	organization	is	daunting.	Understanding	them	within	the	context	of	the	Department	of	Defense	(DoD),	let	alone	the	full	scope	of	relationships	with	other	government,	industrial,	and	academic	organizations,	is	an	overwhelming	task	that	warrants	some	illustration.	By	its	own	estimates,	the	number	of	active	and	reserve	military	personnel	and	civilian	personnel	in	DoD	is	roughly	2.8	million	(United	States	Department	of	Defense	2017).	The	number	of	contractors	supporting	DoD	is	difficult	to	calculate	(Elmendorf	2015).	However,	the	700,000	is	a	common	estimate	(DiIulio	2014).2	The	end	result	is	about	3.5	million	people	spread	out	across	the	globe	in	disaggregated	organizational	structures.	So,	expecting	a	new	researcher	to	understand	even	the	DoD	level	of	context	is	equivalent	to	expecting	them	to	quickly	comprehend	the	entire	population	and	cultural	patterns	of	a	large	urban	area	or	small	country.	The	scale	of	the	organization	also	makes	it	difficult	to	make	definitive	statements	about	how	“the	military”	does	things,	which	creates	challenges	in	bringing	external	researchers	up	to	speed	on	the	research	and	implementation	contexts.		Social	science	research	conducted	by	researchers	who	did	not	work	within	military	organizations	sometimes	suffered	from	lack	of	understanding	of	the	military	context	with	its	complex	array	of	confounding	factors.	External	researchers’	limited	understanding	of	the																																																									1	The	views	presented	in	this	report	are	the	author’s	alone	and	do	not	represent	the	position	of	the	United	States	Marine	Corps.		2	This	number	appears	frequently	in	news	articles	and	websites.	All	seems	to	trace	back	to	John	DiIulio’s	analysis	of	two	reports	by	the	Government	Accountability	Office	in	which	he	attempts	to	estimate	full	time	equivalent	personnel.	His	estimate	is	the	most	reasonable	available,	but	he	is	clear	that	it	is	an	estimate.	Who	counts	as	a	defense	contractor	and	for	what	percentage	of	their	time	is	complicated	by	factors	such	as	subcontracting,	individuals	working	on	many	different	projects,	only	some	of	which	are	related	to	DoD,	and	different	funding	categories.	An	accurate	head	count	is	not	only	impractical,	but	also	not	particularly	useful	in	understanding	the	presence	and	influence	of	contractors	in	the	sector.		
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supporting	establishment3	bureaucracy	also	meant	that	they	often	communicated	results	and	recommendations	that	were	not	viable	within	existing	implementation	processes.4	Yet,	projects	conducted	by	personnel	within	military	organizations	sometimes	suffered	from	other	kinds	of	problems	-	weak	problem	framing,	mismatched	subject	matter	expertise,	and	constraints	on	questions,	methods,	and	results.	Both	internal	and	external	approaches	to	conducting	research	tended	to	be	influenced	by	institutional	bias	toward	experimental	design,	quantitative	results,	and	highly	structured	contact	between	researchers	and	military	personnel.	Both	approaches	made	it	difficult	to	challenge	the	assumptions	and	biases	inherent	in	government	calls	for	research.	Both	approaches	also	tended	to	frustrate	researchers	and	practitioners5	and	too	often	yielded	results	that	were	difficult	to	implement.		Our	second	set	of	concerns,	those	about	leveraging	expertise,	were	similarly	focused	on	existing	expertise-related	practices	in	military	organizations.	A	full	examination	of	the	discourses	and	practices	related	to	expertise	in	military	organizations	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	report,	but	a	few	comments	are	necessary.	By	the	time	we	were	setting	up	the	research	group,	I	was	coming	to	understand	some	aspects	of	how	topical	and	scientific	expertise	are	viewed.	Decision-making	in	military	organizations	is	usually	rushed.	When	scientific	or	“subject	matter	expert”	(SME)	advice	is	sought,	leaders	have	little	or	no	time	to	find	appropriate	expertise,	let	alone	assess	the	credentials	of	the	person(s)	who	ends	up	giving	the	advice.	The	default	orientation	to	expertise	is	to	view	it	as	topical,	as	subject	matter	expertise.	Civilian	SMEs	generally	are	hired	for	knowledge	that	is	(or	at	least	is	presumed	to	be)	already	in	their	heads.		While	I	question	whether	or	not	it	is	intentional,	SMEs	are	effectively	treated	as	a	consumable	commodity.	Few	military	organizations	have	the	necessary	personnel	policies	in	place	that	would	allow	a	topical	expert	to	actively	maintain	or	further	develop	their																																																									3	In	this	report,	the	term	“supporting	establishment”	is	used	as	a	convenience	in	contrasting	“operating	forces”	with	organizations	whose	primary	role	is	to	support	the	development	and	maintenance	of	the	operating	forces	or	those	that	are	primarily	involved	with	policy	and	management	at	higher	levels	within	the	service.	Marine	Corps	personnel	use	a	finer-grained	set	of	distinctions	with	more	than	two	categories.		4	While	it	is	usually	not	intentional,	military	organizations	often	adopt	research	results	“cafeteria	style,”	taking	on	only	those	findings	and	recommendations	that	are	in	alignment	with	existing	institutional	orientations.	They	also	tend	to	alter	recommended	courses	of	action	to	suit	existing	processes,	policies,	and	venues.	These	adoption	patterns	mean	that	critical	aspects	of	recommendations	may	be	stripped	off	before	or	during	implementation,	leading	to	unexpected	outcomes.	However,	it	is	possible	to	learn	about	these	patterns	and	design	recommendations	that	are	more	likely	to	withstand	pressures	during	implementation.	5	For	the	purposes	of	this	report,	the	term	“practitioner”	is	used	to	refer	to	military	and	civilian	personnel	in	military	organizations.		
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expertise	and	professional	networks.	There	also	is	a	fairly	common	practice	of	assigning	responsibility	for	topical	expertise	based	on	position	rather	than	credentials.	This	practice	is	applied	to	both	military	and	civilian	personnel.	In	this	approach	to	expertise,	if	you	hold	a	particular	position	or	are	assigned	to	a	particular	set	of	tasks,	part	of	your	job	is	to	become	the	organization’s	expert	in	one	or	more	topics.	It	is	surprisingly	common	for	people	with	little	or	no	relevant	background	and	no	access	to	scientific	literature	to	be	assigned	to	become	the	expert	on	something.	The	individual	thus	assigned	may	have	some	background	in	research	or	s/he	may	simply	be	the	only	person	who	has	the	spare	time	to	look	into	an	issue.	Most	importantly,	individuals	assigned	to	become	experts	on	a	topic	often	do	not	have	the	authority	to	say	no	or	to	redirect	the	organization	to	a	more	appropriate	source	(Fosher	2015).	It	is	important	to	recognize	that	this	approach	is	understood	to	be	problematic.	I	have	heard	leaders	of	military	organizations	express	concern	about	their	organizations	being	only	“Wikipedia	deep”	or	“Google	deep”	on	issues.	However,	military	leaders	are	trained	to	understand	that	no	activity	will	ever	be	perfectly	run	and	no	knowledge-base	will	ever	be	complete.	They	learn	to	make	judgments	about	where	to	assume	risk.	Given	the	pace	of	decision-making	and	the	difficulty	of	hiring	and	contract	processes	used	to	bring	in	additional	voices,	this	approach	to	expertise	is	often	a	risk	they	judge	to	be	necessary.		The	idea	of	scientific	expertise	does	not	have	the	well-worn	channels	of	discourse	and	practice	seen	with	topical	expertise.	In	my	experience,	with	a	few	exceptions,6	scientists	and	researchers	were	thought	of	as	mostly	being	outside	government,	in	universities,	think	tanks,	or	industry.		There	might	be	people	with	scientific	backgrounds	working	in	other	roles	–	analyst,	program	manager,	etc.	–	within	an	organization,	but	the	idea	of	them	actually	doing	science	always	seemed	to	bring	people	up	short.	The	idea	of	internal	personnel	doing	science	wasn’t	necessarily	seen	in	a	negative	light,	it	was	just	outside	the	normal	frame	of	thinking.	There	also	was	a	strong	tendency	to	conflate	topical	expertise	and	technology	development	with	scientific	expertise.	We	have	been	very	deliberate	in	our	efforts	to	shift	this	discourse.	We	emphasized	the	importance	of	theory	and	method	and	the	value	of	different	disciplines.	We	made	distinctions,	such	as	the	idea	that	subject	matter	experts	are	brought	in	because	of	what	they	already	know,	but	scientists	are	brought	in	because	of	what	they	can	find	out,	because	of	their	ability	to	solve	novel	problems	and	produce	new	knowledge.	We	had	some																																																									6	Personnel	in	military	organizations	usually	are	aware	that	there	are	operations	researchers,	data	analysts,	and	psychologists	working	somewhere	in	the	organization.	They	also	are	usually	aware	that	there	are	faculty	in	professional	military	education	organizations.	Many	are	less	aware	of	finer	grained	distinctions	such	as	whether	an	activity	is	analysis	or	research	and	whether	an	individual	is	working	as	an	analyst,	scientist,	or	clinician.	
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successes	with	these	discursive	shifts,	although	there	is	a	long	way	yet	to	go.	Making	necessary	changes	in	associated	personnel	practices	and	policies	is	an	even	more	complex	task.	While	we	have	had	some	successes	in	creating	scientifically	oriented	position	descriptions	for	social	and	behavioral	scientists	in	Marine	Corps	organizations,	there	are	still	significant	challenges.	Some	of	these	are	described	in	the	section	on	implementation	challenges	below.		In	addition	to	addressing	the	discursive	concerns	above,	we	made	the	decision	to	frame	the	group’s	capability	on	field	social	science	in	an	effort	to	break	the	cycle	of	the	historical	relationship	between	anthropology	and	the	U.S.	Department	of	Defense	(DoD).	While	a	full	examination	of	that	relationship	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	report,	it	is	reasonable	to	say	that	it	was	fraught	with	legitimate	concerns	about	the	ethical	and	political	implications	of	social	scientists	working	with	or	for	military	and	intelligence	organizations	(Albro,	et	al.	2012;	Deitchman	2014	[1976];	Peacock,	et	al.	2007;	Price	2011;	Rubinstein,	et	al.	2012;	Rubinstein	2012).	We	wanted	to	see	if	it	was	possible	to	create	a	space	where	researchers	from	fieldwork-focused	social	science	disciplines	could	work	within	their	respective	codes	of	ethics	and	have	the	autonomy	necessary	to	ensure	professional	integrity.	We	also	were	aware	that	the	military’s	increased	interest	in	what	was	referred	to	as	“cultural	training	and	education”	was,	in	fact,	a	symptom	of	a	broader	problem.	If	a	broader	range	of	social	scientists,	holding	appropriate	roles,7	had	been	present	within	the	institution	we	felt	that	the	direction	of	culture-related	programs,	as	well	as	many	other	programs	and	decisions,	might	have	been	different.	So,	while	we	wanted	to	build	a	capability	for	research	and	science	advising,	the	broader	purpose	of	the	setting	up	the	group	was	to	create	the	kind	of	environment	where	anthropologists,	geographers,	sociologists,	and	other	researchers	from	scarce	disciplines	would	feel	comfortable	making	a	career	and	where	they	could	influence	thinking	and	action	over	the	coming	decades.8																																																									7	DoD	and	the	intelligence	community	employed	many	cultural	anthropologists,	archaeologists,	geographers,	sociologists,	etc.	in	the	time	between	the	last	phase	of	intense	institutional	interest	in	culture	(the	1960s)	and	the	present.	It	is	not	possible	to	track	all	the	different	positions	they	held.	However,	in	most	cases	their	roles	do	not	seem	to	have	provided	them	sufficient	opportunity	to	shape	programs	and	leadership	thought	in	ways	that	more	fully	integrated	contemporary	perspectives	from	their	disciplines	into	their	organization’s	decision-making	processes.	With	regard	to	anthropology,	the	discipline’s	reluctance	to	engage	at	the	institutional	level,	while	understandable,	has	exacerbated	the	situation	in	some	ways	that	are	not	always	visible	outside	military	organizations.	It	has	led	to	a	situation	where	what	constitutes	anthropology	and	appropriate	roles	for	anthropologists,	or	even	what	credentials	make	one	an	anthropologist,	are	defined	by	people	who	may	not	have	the	long-term	interests	of	the	discipline	as	a	primary	concern.		8	Although	this	was	not	a	key	element	in	discussions	about	setting	up	the	group,	I	also	wanted	to	demonstrate	the	value	of	fieldwork-focused	social	science	for	the	
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The	result	of	our	deliberations	about	the	issues	above	was	the	formation	of	the	Translational	Research	Group	(TRG).	The	group	was	designed	to	house	social	scientists	within	a	military	organization	so	they	would	understand	the	context	and	implementation	processes,	but	have	significantly	greater	academic	freedom	and	protection	from	other	demands	on	their	time	than	the	norm.	We	wanted	them	close	enough	to	the	tyranny	of	the	urgent	to	understand	how	it	affected	the	ways	their	results	might	be	understood	and	implemented.	Yet,	we	also	needed	to	protect	them	from	the	urgency	and	the	organization’s	tendency	to	indulge	in	crisis	mode.		We	drew	on	the	concept	of	action	anthropology	and	the	model	of	translational	research	from	medicine,	which	focuses	on	moving	basic	research	into	use	as	quickly	as	possible	(Rubinstein	1986;	Woolf	2008).		The	group’s	approach	emphasizes	close	collaboration	between	researchers	and	practitioners.	While	researchers	retain	control	of	the	research	design,	collaboration	with	practitioners	can	help	them	develop	research	questions	and,	later,	recommendations	that	more	closely	track	with	practitioner	needs	and	implementation	context.	They	also	learn	how	to	communicate	research	results	in	forms	accessible	and	usable	by	practitioners.	In	turn,	the	practitioners	become	more	aware	of	the	constraints	and	processes	of	research,	making	them	more	adept	at	asking	viable	research	questions	and	taking	advantage	of	results.		The	translational	research	model	in	medicine	has	been	critiqued	for	masking	a	dangerous	slide	away	from	basic	research	and	toward	a	purely	applied	research	agenda	(Jogalekar	2012).	Despite	these	critiques,	we	felt	that	we	could	draw	on	the	best	aspects	of	the	action	anthropology/translational	model,	creating	a	middle	space	between	basic	and	applied	research.	In	this	space,	we	hoped	to	conduct	field	social	science	research	that	was	characterized	by:	
• theoretically	and	methodologically	rigorous	design	
• critical	analysis	of	problem	framing	and	existing	assumptions	
• close	consultation	with	practitioners	familiar	with	the	problems,	contextual	factors,	and	implementation	processes	associated	with	the	research	
• long	term,	multi-context	contact	with	research	participants	
																																																								military	to	study	itself.	In	particular,	I	wanted	to	contrast	our	use	of	social	science	with	more	problematic	programs,	such	as	the	operational	support	function	of	the	Army’s	Human	Terrain	System	(HTS).	For	an	overview	of	some	of	the	concerns	about	HTS	see	Albro,	Robert,	et	al.	2009	AAA	Commission	on	the	Engagement	of	Anthropology	with	the	US	Security	and	Intelligence	Communities	(CEAUSSIC)	Final	Report	on	The	Army’s	Human	Terrain	System	Proof	of	Concept	Program.	American	Anthropological	Association.		
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• research	designs	and	reporting	that	were	attentive	to	the	institutional	context	and	discourses	in	which	results	might	be	assessed	and	implemented.	One	particularly	important	aspect	of	designing	the	capability	was	that	we	retained	the	autonomy	to	choose	our	own	projects	rather	than	simply	respond	to	tasking.	This	was	established	by	decoupling	funding	for	salaries,	travel,	and	other	operating	costs	from	specific	projects	and	by	the	director	requiring	autonomy	as	a	condition	of	setting	up	the	group.	As	within	any	government	organization,	there	are	limits	to	how	much	autonomy	can	be	promised.	(We	do	operate	within	certain	parameters	in	that	we	have	to	focus	on	issues	that	are	relevant	to	the	organization	and	within	our	available	funds.)	This	freedom	has	meant	that	we	do	not	have	to	conduct	research	on	poorly	conceptualized	buzzwords	or	design	research	in	ways	that	suit	institutional	comfort	zones.		We	also	ensured	that,	because	researchers	would	remain	in	the	institutional	context,	it	would	be	more	possible	for	them	to	provide	long-term	support	for	implementation,	something	that	was	hard	for	external	researchers	to	do	once	funding	for	their	specific	project	had	ended.	This	long-term	presence	also	could	facilitate	developing	the	relationships	necessary	for	researchers	to	be	involved	in	advising	leaders	and	participating	in	problem	framing.	The	weakness	in	this	aspect	of	the	group’s	design	is	that	it	is	heavily	dependent	on	senior	leader	buy-in	and	trust.	A	change	in	the	group’s	leadership	or	in	the	composition	of	the	organizational	leadership	above	the	group	could	make	it	very	difficult	to	maintain	the	autonomy.		The	group	was	established	within	the	Marine	Corps	center	that	handles	culture	and	language	training	and	education.	The	decision	to	host	TRG	within	the	culture	center	made	sense	in	terms	of	available	personnel	billets,	contracts,	space,	and,	most	importantly,	the	leadership.	Both	the	culture	center’s	leadership	and	the	next	level	of	leadership	were	involved	in	thinking	through	the	challenges	in	the	Marine	Corps’	research	capability.	While	being	in	the	culture	center	made	sense	from	the	standpoint	of	launching	the	capability	in	a	context	where	leadership	understood	the	complexity	of	the	experiment,	this	choice	of	location	did	create	challenges,	some	of	which	are	described	below.		During	the	first	seven	years	of	the	group’s	existence,	we	have	conducted	qualitative	research	on	a	broad	range	of	topics	including	Marine	concepts	of	stress	and	resilience,	the	value	of	advanced	degrees	for	enlisted	personnel,	how	Marine	understanding	and	use	of	culture-related	training	changes	over	the	course	of	the	deployment	cycle,	critical	analysis	of	DoD	narratives	about	the	future,	and	problems	with	DoD’s	ability	to	effectively	leverage	scientific	expertise.	We	also	have	supported	the	culture	center’s	curriculum	development	and	assessment	efforts.	Although	these	efforts	have	been	productive,	the	most	important	and	effective	work	of	the	group	has	been	in	scientific	advising.	By	being	
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present	in	meetings,	available	to	answer	calls	and	emails	or	have	a	quick	chat	over	coffee,	and	through	various	other	interactions,	we	have	been	able	to	provide	perspectives	from	our	various	disciplines	as	different	elements	of	the	Marine	Corps	make	decisions.		Science	advising	gives	us	the	opportunity	to	have	a	voice	in	discussions	and	decisions	about	the	development	of	research	agendas	(not	only	for	our	own	group),	the	way	programs	are	shaped,	how	research	claims	are	vetted,	and	what	recommendations	are	implemented.	Sometimes	we	are	advising	from	our	own	disciplinary	perspectives,	but	sometimes	we	make	recommendations	for	the	organization	to	reach	out	to	experts	in	other	fields	so	that	they	get	the	best	possible	advice.	Our	advisory	work	makes	it	possible	for	us	to	support	implementation	of	research	results,	a	process	that	sometimes	takes	episodic	attention	over	a	period	of	several	years.	It	also	makes	it	possible	for	us	to	help	Marine	Corps	leaders	shape	which	questions	get	asked	at	the	beginning	of	initiatives	or	programs,	something	which	can	fundamentally	alter	the	approach	of	the	organization.		A	full	description	of	the	topics	and	modes	of	our	science	advising	efforts	would	be	beyond	the	limitations	of	a	field	report.	However,	we	have	advised	on	topics	aligned	with	our	research,	as	well	as	other	matters,	such	as	the	weakness	of	generational	cohort	research	as	a	basis	for	military	decision-making,	limitations	of	functional	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(a	type	of	“brain	scan”)	technology	for	understanding	the	effect	of	training	and	education,	how	to	incorporate	disease	and	public	health	issues	into	concepts	of	the	future	operating	environment,	value	conflicts,	approaches	to	ethics	in	military	education,	and	many	other	issues.	Throughout	all	our	efforts	on	research,	curriculum,	and	science	advising,	we	have	focused	not	only	on	giving	sound	advice,	but	also	on	integrating	sound,	contemporary	social	science	theory	into	decision-making.	I	don’t	want	to	give	the	impression	that	we	are	always	successful	in	our	efforts.	We	are	not.	No	group	ever	is.	In	fact,	we	fail	or	have	only	partial	success	more	often	than	we	fully	succeed.	However,	persisting	in	the	effort	is	part	of	the	longer-term	goal	of	integrating	social	science	and	social	scientists	more	fully	in	how	the	organization	does	business.		
	
Implementation	challenges	Initial	support	for	the	group	was	strong	among	civilian	and	military	leaders	within	the	Marine	Corps.	Many	shared	scientists’	concerns	about	existing	models	of	research.	Publications	and	advising	by	the	group’s	researchers	were	reasonably	well	received	and	used,	if	not	always	perfectly.	However,	we	encountered	obstacles	that	prevented	full	development	of	the	group	and	execution	of	the	intended	research	agenda.	From	the	standpoint	of	creating	a	sustainable	organization,	we	had	
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funding,	positioning,	and	personnel	structure	challenges,	all	of	which	were	heavily	influenced	by	existing	patterns	of	operation	within	DoD.	Of	these	issues,	positioning	and	personnel	structure,	rather	than	funding,	were	the	most	significant.		
Funding:	While	the	group	has	not	experienced	the	major	cuts	of	some	organizations,	federal	budget	sequestration	and	other	factors	have	taken	their	toll.	The	group	voluntarily	cut	two	positions	to	support	overall	cuts	in	the	larger	organization.	While	difficult,	these	cuts	had	the	benefit	of	reducing	my	administrative	burden	as	the	group’s	director	and	we	adapted	well.	More	significantly,	it	has	become	very	hard	to	predict	the	availability	of	travel	funds	for	both	government	and	contract	personnel,	making	it	difficult	to	plan	large-scale	research	projects.	Likewise,	federal	contracting	regulations	are	opaque	and	we	are	vulnerable	to	the	changing	interpretations	of	the	rules	by	the	government	personnel	who	manage	the	contracts.	For	example,	some	years	we	are	told	we	can	purchase	books,	articles,	and	fieldwork	equipment	using	contracts,	other	years	we	are	told	it	is	prohibited.		In	combination,	these	issues	of	funding	unpredictability	made	it	difficult	for	us	to	give	clear	statements	of	what	we	could	and	could	not	support	when	people	asked	us	for	research	or	advisory	assistance	with	their	problems.	The	uncertainty	about	the	federal	budget	made	some	contracted	researchers	uneasy	about	their	job	security,	fears	that	we	could	not,	in	good	faith,	waive	away,	even	when	we	were	fairly	certain	our	funding	would	be	safe.	Funding	concerns	also	made	me	cautious	when	talking	with	potential	new	group	members,	as	I	could	no	longer	say	with	any	certainty	how	long	we	would	be	able	to	retain	them	or	even	be	sure	we	could	support	the	travel	and	equipment	needed	to	execute	their	research.	Yet,	in	some	ways,	funding	issues	of	all	sorts	are	predictable	parts	of	the	implementation	context	within	a	large,	federal	organization.	Several	features	of	TRG’s	design	helped	us	handle	these	inevitabilities.	We	were	fortunate	that	contracted	researchers	were	employed	through	multiple	contracts	used	to	support	our	host	organization.	This	meant	we	were	never	vulnerable	to	losing	the	entire	team	if	there	was	a	problem	with	one	contract	or	if	the	company	holding	the	contract	changed.	Because	funding	was	associated	with	the	capability	as	a	whole,	rather	than	linked	to	specific	projects,	we	were	not	constantly	having	to	look	for	new	lines	of	funding	at	a	time	when	such	lines	were	being	cut	or	delayed.	Also,	the	group’s	funding	was	imbricated	with	the	culture	center’s	budget	and	capability.	So,	had	somebody	targeted	us	specifically	for	cuts,	it	would	have	been	very	difficult	for	them	to	do	so	without	simultaneously	
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harming	the	culture	center,	actions	that	would	have	been	far	more	visible	and	harder	to	justify.			
Positioning:	The	positioning	of	the	group	within	the	Marine	Corps’	culture	center	made	sense	as	a	way	to	safely	launch	and	protect	the	initiative	in	an	environment	where	we	had	strong	institutional	support	and	the	advocacy	of	several	influential	leaders.	Additionally,	the	culture	center’s	director	allowed	us	to	make	use	of	the	center’s	physical	and	administrative	infrastructure.	The	importance	of	this	last	benefit	cannot	be	overstated.	Had	I	been	forced	to	learn	about	all	the	byzantine	programming,	budgetary,	contractual,	administrative,	and	legal	aspects	of	running	a	stand-alone	organization	within	the	Marine	Corps,	the	group	would	never	have	gotten	started.		However,	positioning	within	the	culture	center	also	has	had	a	few	downsides.	Internally,	some	individuals	within	the	culture	center	resisted	TRG’s	presence.	They	did	not	understand	the	mission	of	the	research	group	and	resented	the	presence	of	researchers	who	did	not	seem	to	contribute	much	to	the	training	and	education	missions	of	the	center.	During	the	early	years,	I	spent	a	great	deal	of	time	trying	to	socialize	the	purpose	of	the	group	and	highlight	the	benefits	we	brought	to	the	culture	center.	However,	military	personnel	change	every	two	or	three	years	and	some	people	with	more	enduring	positions	were	simply	determined	to	misunderstand	the	roles	we	played.	I	gradually	realized	that	I	was	in	a	never-ending	cycle	of	advocacy	and	argument	with	people	who	ultimately	had	no	influence	over	me	or	TRG’s	function.	Interestingly,	once	I	stopped	trying	to	convince	people	and	simply	asserted	what	we	do,	many	of	our	internal	problems	stopped	or	died	down.	In	retrospect,	this	outcome	should	have	been	predictable	based	on	my	understanding	of	the	discursive	patterns	of	the	Marine	Corps	supporting	establishment.	There	are	still	some	internal	tensions	and	they	can	be	frustrating	for	new	researchers,	but	the	strategy	of	asserting	rather	than	persuading	does	work.	This	strategy	might	have	been	less	successful	with	less	supportive	leadership	or	if	I	had	not	learned	to	be	less	diplomatic	and	more	forceful	in	my	interactions.	Externally,	the	position	within	the	culture	center	sometimes	made	it	difficult	for	people	to	understand	the	broader	purpose	of	the	research	group.	People	understandably	assumed	that	we	did	research	only	on	issues	supporting	the	culture	center’s	mission,	studies	of	“cultures”	or	terrorism.	It	was	difficult	for	them	to	understand	why	we	would	be	involved	in	studying	Marines	and	Marine	Corps	organizations.	Consequently,	we	were	not	the	first	organization	people	thought	of	when	seeking	research	or	advice	on	these	issues.	Over	time	this	made	it	difficult	
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to	gain	access	to	discussions	of	problems	and	decision-makers	without	an	unrealistic	level	of	constant,	active	support	from	senior	leaders.		One	alternative	to	direct	support	from	senior	leaders	would	have	been	for	me,	as	the	group’s	director,	to	engage	extensive	salesmanship	and	buzzword	chasing	to	create	attention	and	demand	signal	for	TRG’s	work.	This	is	a	common	strategy	in	DoD	research	circles.	In	addition	to	my	personal	disinterest	and	lack	of	skill	in	these	activities,	I	felt	they	would	have	led	the	group	down	a	path	that	undermined	our	original	intent,	especially	with	regard	to	critiquing	problem	framing.	Another	option	would	have	been	to	move	the	group	to	another	organization	where	its	function	would	be	more	noticeable	and	understandable	to	outside	stakeholders.	However,	during	the	time	period	in	which	such	a	move	could	have	been	made,	we	judged	the	internal	command	climates	of	all	potential	receiving	organizations	would	have	made	it	difficult	to	continue	with	our	original	intent.	The	risk	of	being	turned	into	an	office	of	desk-bound	policy	analysts	was	too	high.	We	have	overcome	this	positional	weakness	to	some	degree	through	the	good	work	done	by	the	researchers,	but	it	does	make	our	access	to	important	issues,	problems,	and	decision-makers	somewhat	personality	dependent.		
Personnel	structure:		The	most	intractable	implementation	challenge	for	the	research	capability	has	been	personnel.	Our	original	for	the	research	group	involved	quickly	transitioning	our	personnel	from	contractor	to	government	status.	This	shift	was	made	impossible	by	an	unanticipated	hiring	freeze,	budget	sequestration,	and	other	organizational	changes.	This	set	of	circumstances	has	left	us	with	a	structure	where	I,	as	the	group’s	director,	am	the	only	government	employee.	All	the	research	personnel,	as	well	as	the	group’s	deputy	and	our	research	assistant,	are	contractors.		The	problems	associated	with	recruiting	specific	types	of	scientific	personnel	through	different	types	of	contracts	are	very	complex.	However,	to	give	one	example,	the	culture	center	uses	a	type	of	contract	in	which	the	government	must	describe	only	the	capability	to	be	delivered	and	cannot	specify	the	way	a	company	provides	it	or	the	qualifications	of	the	personnel	they	hire	to	do	the	work.	In	effect,	this	means	I	cannot	even	tell	a	company	what	disciplinary	backgrounds	or	degree	level	I	need,	let	alone	participate	in	the	recruiting,	selection,	and	interviewing	of	candidates.	There	is	a	short	window	in	which	the	government	client	can	reject	an	individual	the	company	has	hired,	but	the	process	is	neither	swift	nor	easy.		To	further	complicate	matters,	contracting	company	human	resource	departments	often	have	little	experience	with	how	to	assess	the	quality	of	a	scientific	resume.	They	may	not	even	be	able	to	make	to	make	
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distinctions	among	disciplines,	such	as	knowing	that	a	political	scientist	and	a	sociologist	are	not	the	same,	or	subfields,	such	as	understanding	that	biological	and	cultural	anthropologists	have	very	different	capabilities.	So,	we	are	left	with	a	situation	where	it	is	quite	possible	to	need	a	PhD	level	cultural	geographer,	but	have	the	company	hire	somebody	with	an	MA	in	theology.		While	we	did	manage	to	assemble	a	good	initial	group	of	research	personnel	and	to	bring	on	new	researchers	as	needed,	it	has	been	in	spite	of,	rather	than	because	of,	normal	contracting	processes.	The	use	of	contracts	to	provide	the	bulk	of	research	group	personnel	created	a	number	of	other	problems,	as	well.	One	of	the	most	obvious	was	that,	as	the	only	government	official	within	the	group,	much	of	my	time	was	consumed	by	“government	only”	administrative	responsibilities.	This	severely	impaired	my	ability	to	maintain	my	own	scholarship	and	reduced	my	credibility	as	a	scientific	leader	inside	and	outside	the	group.	A	less	obvious	consequence	involved	our	intersection	with	the	large	presence	of	other	contractors	across	nearly	all	DoD	activities.	When	the	group’s	researchers	conducted	critical	assessments	of	policy	development	or	training,	they	inevitably	were	critiquing	the	work	of	other	contracting	companies,	something	that	is	frowned	upon,	when	not	prohibited	outright.	This	negatively	affected	the	level	of	detail	provided	in	some	reports	and	had	a	chilling	effect	on	my	willingness	to	consider	supporting	some	lines	of	research	where	I	knew	we	would	be	looking	at	the	performance	of	other	contractors.	Lack	of	government	status	also	inhibited	researcher	participation	in	implementation.	Contracted	researchers	can	and	do	advise	on	implementing	scientific	findings.	What	they	cannot	do	is	represent	government	positions	or	make	decisions	that	entail	government	resources.	Several	of	the	group’s	researchers	have	become	adept	at	advising,	but	are	still	limited	in	the	roles	they	can	play	during	implementation.	However,	the	most	damaging	effect	of	our	personnel	situation	was	that	it	limited	researcher	participation	in	the	trust	networks	civilian	and	military	leaders	use	to	inform	their	decision-making.	As	I	have	described	elsewhere	(Fosher	2015),	leaders	in	military	organizations	rely	heavily	on	trust	relationships	with	scientists	or	intermediaries	to	help	them:		
• assess	researcher	qualifications,		
• determine	what	research	to	support,		
• identify	which	claims	to	accept,	and		
• decide	how	to	integrate	results.		Although	many	of	the	group’s	researchers	are	trusted	by	decision-makers,	their	contractor	status	always	inserts	some	distance	and	caution	into	the	relationship.	Regardless	of	how	pure	your	intentions,	it	is	difficult	to	position	yourself	as	an	honest	broker	when	the	person	you	are	advising	
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knows	your	company	is	dependent	on	future	contracts.		
	
Successes,	challenges,	and	lessons	learned	
Successes:	 	 	Despite	the	implementation	challenges	described	above,	the	group	has	had	a	surprising	number	of	successes.	It	is	not	as	easy	as	one	might	think	to	explain	the	group’s	successes	to	an	external	audience,	even	one	familiar	with	anthropology	outside	the	academy.	Implementation	in	military	organizations	sometimes	can	take	years	and	may	be	partial	or	results	may	be	adopted	in	unexpected,	yet	positive	ways.	Our	most	well-known	project	in	the	early	years	can	illustrate	various	points	on	the	spectrum	of	success.	In	late	2010,	one	of	our	researchers,	Frank	Tortorello,	became	interested	in	the	way	the	Marine	Corps	was	framing	issues	of	stress	and	resilience.	Concerned	with	the	trend	toward	biological	reductionism	he	was	seeing,	he	began	to	look	a	critical	analysis	of	discourse	and	practice	surrounding	the	concept	of	resilience.	The	work	soon	caught	the	attention	of	a	couple	of	senior	leaders	in	the	service	and	we	were	able	to	expand	both	the	researcher’s	participation	in	problem	framing	and	policy	development	and	the	research	project	itself	(Marcellino	and	Tortorello	2015;	Tortorello	2014;	Tortorello	and	Marcellino	2013).	Over	the	years,	responsibility	for	developing	programs	and	guidance	on	resilience	has	shifted	many	times.	With	each	shift,	the	shape	of	the	implementation	opportunities	changed.	One	organization	was	focused	on	creating	top-level	guidance	for	implementation	by	other	organizations.	Another	organization	was	focused	on	developing	resilience	training.	Still	another	was	interested	in	screening	individuals	for	likely	resilience	levels	at	some	point	during	recruiting.		This	made	for	a	shifting,	complex,	and	often	frustrating	implementation	landscape.	The	lead	researcher’s	participation	in	meetings	and	working	groups	did	influence	the	way	the	service	approached	the	issues,	although	never	as	fully	or	quickly	as	he	would	have	preferred.	In	particular,	it	was	an	important	part	of	keeping	open	a	line	of	discussion	about	the	potential	influence	of	education	and	training	on	Marines’	ability	to	conceptualize	and	respond	to	stress.	This	line	of	discourse	was	and	is	essential	to	making	it	possible	for	the	Marine	Corps	to	consider	programs	and	actions	that	are	not	exclusively	focused	on	biological	aspects	of	stress.	Likewise,	the	results	of	the	research	were	not	adopted	as	fully	as	he	had	hoped.	Some	concepts	made	their	way	into	guiding	documents.	Some	applied	products	got	used	by	one	command	or	another.	His	insights	were	never	fully	integrated	across	the	spectrum	of	Marine	Corps	efforts.	However,	although	the	research	ended	several	years	ago	and	he	has	since	moved	on	to	another	job,	we	are	still	seeing	the	effects	of	his	work.	In	the	month	that	I	am	writing	this,	we	got	a	request	for	advice	and	products	to	help	shape	
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the	approach	to	building	resilience	in	a	Marine	Corps	organization,	a	request	that	was	based	on	somebody	seeing	one	small	product	that	he	had	developed.		Other	projects	have	followed	similar	trajectories.	Implementation	irarely	happens	at	a	wholesale	scale.	There	seem	to	be	two	main	patterns	that	characterize	efforts	that	are	successful	over	time.	The	first	is	the	continuing	presence	of	the	researcher	over	long	implementation	timelines	to	help	organizations	figure	out	how	to	adopt	ideas	within	their	particular	constraints.	This	pattern	was	anticipated	in	the	design	of	the	research	group.	The	other	pattern	was	not	something	I	had	thought	of	in	the	group’s	design.	Projects	that	are	successful	are	those	where	the	lead	researcher	or	his/her	team	are	willing	to	develop	a	very	broad	range	of	project	outcomes.	In	the	case	of	the	resilience	project,	the	researchers	developed	scholarly	publications,	applied	white	papers,	briefs,	classes,	curriculum	support	materials,	advisory	memos,	what	must	have	felt	like	an	endless	stream	of	one	page	project	overviews	targeted	to	different	audiences,	annotated	bibliographies,	and	a	collection	of	releasable	interview	transcripts.	These	products	served	two	purposes.	The	first	was	symbolic.	It	was	useful	to	be	able	to	point	to	all	the	outcomes	of	the	project	when	the	use	of	resources	or	time	was	questioned.	The	second	purpose	was	more	substantive.	Practitioners	with	little	time	were	much	more	likely	to	engage	with	us	and	the	broader	project	if	they	first	encountered	it	through	a	product	that	was	framed	in	ways	that	spoke	to	their	own	concerns.	So,	somebody	charged	with	weaving	resilience	into	a	training	schedule	might	not	read	an	advisory	memo	or	applied	report,	but	might	pick	up	an	example	of	a	training	scenario	and	contact	us	as	a	result.			
Challenges	and	lessons	learned:	It	is	always	tempting	to	focus	on	individual	successes	in	projects	or	overcoming	obstacles.	Yet,	our	primary	goal	had	not	been	individual	successes,	but	rather	progress	in	improving	the	ability	of	the	Marine	Corps	to	make	effective	and	appropriate	use	of	social	and	behavioral	scientists	and	science.	I	tried	to	keep	an	eye	on	that	larger	goal	when	talking	to	leaders	about	the	group	and	its	long-term	viability.	In	2012,	when	it	became	apparent	that	we	would	not	be	able	to	structure	or	staff	the	group	as	intended,	I	recommended	that	we	begin	dismantling	the	group.	Interestingly,	despite	my	perceptions	of	lack	of	success	in	developing	the	capability,	we	were	asked	to	keep	the	group	running	and	see	what	might	happen	over	the	next	several	months	or	years.	I	have	revisited	this	question	with	leaders	a	few	times	since	and	each	time	we	have	been	asked	to	keep	things	going.		In	my	experience	within	DoD	organizations	and	with	military	and	former	military	leaders,	this	type	of	long-term	vision	and	institutional	
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patience	is	characteristic	of	“old	hands”	within	the	supporting	establishment.	They	know	that	sometimes	it	is	necessary	to	keep	a	pilot	light	level	of	capability	viable	and	wait	for	the	time	to	be	right	to	make	a	decision	about	fully	institutionalizing	it	or	shutting	it	down.	While	the	continued	interest	is	heartening,	this	has,	of	course,	created	a	situation	with	its	own	set	of	challenges,	including:	
• expectation	of	the	originally	intended	performance	despite	structural	impediments	
• staff	concerns	about	job	security	
• difficulties	in	managing	long	research	horizons	
• continuing	administrative	demands	that	decrease	my	ability	to	maintain	credibility	as	a	researcher	
• the	need	to	balance	the	original	research	mission	with	increased	support	to	the	day-to-day	functions	of	our	host	organization.	As	of	this	writing,	the	final	status	of	the	research	group	remains	unclear.	Yet,	we	continue	to	have	good	demand	signal	from	a	wide	range	of	Marine	Corps	and	DoD	organizations.	Researchers	still	tell	me	that	they	feel	the	chance	of	having	an	effect	on	the	organization	and	the	lives	of	Marines	outweighs	the	frustrations	and	impediments	they	encounter.	So,	as	Marines	say,	we	endeavor	to	persevere.9		In	hindsight,	while	there	are	some	aspects	of	the	implementation	challenges	that	would	have	been	difficult	to	change,	such	as	the	timing	of	federal	budget	sequestration	or	my	own	personality	limitations	as	a	leader,	there	are	some	lessons	learned	that	are	transferable,	three	of	which	merit	attention	here.	First,	I	could	have	conducted	more	detailed	interviewing	about	institutionalization	processes	before	taking	the	job,	when	senior	leader	investment	was	at	its	height.	This	would	have	helped	me	anticipate	and	perhaps	more	effectively	mitigate	problems	when	stated	intentions	about	the	group	fell	through.	At	the	time	I	was	asked	to	set	up	the	group,	I	was	still	learning	about	a	common	DoD	cultural	pattern	related	to	the	gap	between	senior	leader	intention	and	their	ability	to	execute.	I	believe	leaders	sincerely	intended	to	follow	through	on	their	intentions	with	regard	to	things	like	moving	the	research	personnel	structure	from	contract	to	government.	When	they	were	unable	to	do	so,	it	seemed	like	a	major	issue	to	me,	but	as	“old	hands”	they	saw	it	as	a	normal	hiccough	in	trying	to	get	things	done	in	a	large	bureaucracy.	They	expected	that	I	would	understand	and	adapt	the	capability	to	the	new	reality.	I	have	been	able	to	adapt	it	to	some	extent,	but	not	to	the	point																																																									9	The	phrase	“endeavor	to	persevere”	was	taken	from	a	scene	in	the	1976	western,	The	Outlaw	Josey	Wales	in	which	a	Native	American	is	describing	mistreatment	by	and	eventual	war	against	the	Union.	In	my	experience,	in	the	supporting	establishment,	the	phrase	is	most	commonly	used	when	what	one	is	persevering	against	is	bureaucratic	drag.			
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where	it	is	fully	meeting	the	original	intent.			Second,	I	could	have	established	a	more	rigorous	pattern	of	reporting	the	implications	of	implementation	problems	to	the	organization’s	leaders.	From	time	to	time,	I	would	meet	with	them	and	connect	the	dots	between	an	implementation	obstacle	and	our	inability	to	conduct	a	particular	project.	However,	I	tended	to	focus	on	finding	solutions	rather	than	reporting	problems.	The	Marine	Corps	has	a	strong	institutional	orientation	toward	finding	ways	to	get	the	job	done	in	spite	of	obstacles.		It	is	rare	to	go	a	day	without	hearing	sayings	like	“adapt	and	overcome”	or	“semper	gumby.”	I	have	worked	hard	to	maintain	awareness	of	how	I	am	influenced	by	the	discourses	and	cultural	patterns	within	military	organizations,	as	I	recognize	the	inherent	dangers	they	can	present	to	an	anthropologist.	However,	in	this	case,	I	didn’t	recognize	the	effect	my	choice	to	focus	on	adapting	would	have	on	the	group.	Had	I	more	routinely	and	forcefully	reminded	organizational	leaders	of	the	problems	we	faced	and	the	implications	for	our	work,	we	might	have	been	able	to	mitigate	or	overcome	more	of	the	obstacles.	Of	course,	it	is	also	possible	that	they	would	have	chosen	to	shut	the	group	down.		These	two	lessons	learned	imply	a	third,	the	way	“normal”	tends	to	shift	as	you	make	one	small	adjustment	after	another.	In	the	case	of	the	adaptations	made	for	and	by	the	research	group,	I	do	not	perceive	this	to	have	been	a	major	problem.	In	a	group	of	social	scientists	accustomed	to	critically	analyzing	actions	and	context,	we	tend	to	notice	shifts	in	what	counts	as	business	as	usual.	Also,	I	maintain	a	professional	network	of	individuals	with	varying	opinions	about	my	work	with	the	military	and	encourage	my	researchers	to	do	the	same.	Conversations	along	these	networks	keep	me	wary	of	slippery	slopes	(Fosher	2010).	
	
Conclusion:	next	steps	for	the	literature	of	practice	and	for	TRG	Although	it	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	report	to	delve	into	it,	the	issues	outlined	above	are	clearly	not	limited	to	military	organizations	and	they	suggest	some	things	about	where	we	might	work	on	the	literature	of	practice.		Anthropology	has	a	long	history	with	studying	implementation	in	government	programs	and	is	no	stranger	to	the	study	of	bureaucracy	(Hoag	2011;	Hull	2012;	Pressman	and	Wildavsky	1984;	Zabusky	1995).	There	also	are	plenty	of	accounts	of	similar	problems	and	efforts	to	solve	them	in	other	sectors	in	which	practicing	or	applied	anthropologists	work	in	conjunction	with	large	institutions	and	bureaucracy,	such	as	medical	anthropology,	international	health,	and	development	(Inhorn	and	Wentzell	2012;	Nolan	2002).	Although	I	am	less	familiar	with	anthropology	in	business,	I	would	imagine	these	types	of	challenges	play	out	in	large	organizations	the	private	sector	as	well.	Likewise,	we	have	substantial	literatures,	such	as	those	mentioned	in	the	overview	section	
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above,	providing	critical	perspectives	on	anthropological	engagement	in	military	organizations	that	have	corollaries	in	other	sectors.	We	also	have	a	small,	but	growing	literature	of	practice	that	describes	what	it	is	like	to	work	within	these	sectors	(Nolan	2013).		There	are	two	areas	in	the	literature	I	would	prioritize	for	additional	work.	The	first	is	in	comparing	anthropological	practice	in	large	institutions	or	bureaucracies	across	sectors.	The	gap	I	perceive	is	less	about	producing	an	edited	volume	of	studies	of	or	research	done	for	such	organizations.	Rather,	I	think	what	would	help	move	us	forward	is	a	comparison	of	the	full	range	of	anthropological	practice,	including,	but	not	limited	to	research,	within	such	organizations	and	the	challenges	and	solutions	we	find	for	getting	anthropological	perspectives	used.	The	second	area	where	I	believe	we	have	some	work	to	do	might	best	be	characterized	as	methods	of	practice.	Traditional	and	even	applied	methods	classes	in	anthropology	tend	to	focus	on	research	methods.	Yet	research	is	only	one	part	of	what	practicing	and	applied	anthropologists	do.	We	advise,	craft	policies	and	procedures,	help	frame	problems,	build	working	relationships,	and	many	other	types	of	work.	Although	some	standard	reference	materials	have	started	to	address	implementation	and	policy	engagement,	there	is	more	to	do	(Schensul	1999).	There	are	relatively	few	resources	for	students	or	professionals	looking	for	insights	that	will	help	them	get	results	implemented	or	get	things	done	by	means	other	than	research.			I’ll	conclude	with	a	final	note	on	implementing	the	research	group	within	the	Marine	Corps	context.	It	is	unclear	what	the	long-term	trajectory	and	impact	of	TRG	will	be.	If	the	overall	goal	has	been	to	get	some	fieldwork-based	social	science	research	and	advice	into	discussions	where	it	has	traditionally	been	absent,	then	we	have	succeeded.	If	the	goal	is	to	ensure	this	kind	of	research	and	advising	continues	to	happen	in	ways	that	are	not	dependent	on	the	personality	and	motivations	of	those	of	us	who	started	the	group,	then	we	aren’t	yet	done.	The	capability	is	not	sufficiently	institutionalized	to	stand	without	external	support.	Yet	a	Marine	colleague	recently	reminded	me	of	the	secondary	impacts	of	a	capability	like	ours,	even	if	it	does	not	survive	in	the	end.	He	pointed	out	that	we	have	spent	more	than	half	a	decade	influencing	the	thinking	of	Marines	who	will	take	that	thinking	into	positions	of	greater	responsibility	and,	eventually,	into	their	post-Marine	Corps	civilian	lives.	He	also	remarked	that	we	will	have	added	to	the	pool	of	researchers	in	our	disciplines	who	understand	the	complexity	of	the	military	as	a	social	institution	and,	perhaps	more	importantly,	understand	what	it	takes	to	go	from	idea	to	implementation	in	a	large	bureaucracy.	
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